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Rationality  
 
Andy Denis 
 
From its inception in the marginal revolution of the 1880s, neoclassical economics has depended on 
the notion of a rational economic agent, a Homo economicus.  Equally, the notion of rationality has 
been the focus of criticism from those wishing to dispute one or another aspect of mainstream 
economic thought.  Lagueux (2010) provides an excellent introduction to the literature and the 
issues.  Giocoli (2003, 2005) provides a detailed and highly readable account of the emergence of the 
neoclassical rational individual agent, in particular showing the supersession of the older conception 
of rationality as maximisation by the newer version of rationality as consistency.  In the older 
presentation of the matter, the agent was a recognisably human individual attempting to optimise 
suďjeĐt to ĐoŶstƌaiŶts.  IŶ the lateƌ ǀieǁ, all that is left is ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ: ͞The major meaning of 
rationality is a condition of consistency among choices made from diffeƌeŶt sets of alteƌŶatiǀes͟ 
(Arrow, 1996, p. xiii).  In this view, rationality is defined by the existence of a preference relation 
ǁhiĐh is Đoŵplete aŶd tƌaŶsitiǀe.  GioĐoli͛s poiŶt is that ďoth ŵaǆiŵisatioŶ aŶd ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ aƌe 
requirements of rational behaviour seen from different perspectives – failure to maximise would be 
inconsistent and inconsistency would imply a failure to maximise.  So the displacement of one by the 
otheƌ has ďeeŶ a deǀelopŵeŶt, Ŷot of the ͚ďodǇ of sĐieŶĐe͛, ďut of the ͚iŵage of sĐieŶĐe͛ of 
economics – how economics presents itself both to itself and to the rest of the world.   
Rational behaviour is behaviour in accordance with reason, behaviour which in some sense serves 
the aĐtoƌ͛s iŶteƌests.  Most ǁƌiteƌs seeŵ to aĐĐept that ƌatioŶalitǇ is aŶ esseŶtial pƌeŵiss foƌ aŶǇ 
science of economics.  In so far as economics is a science of human action, there seems to be little 
one can say of action which is unreasonable.  However, much work has gone into distinguishing 
alternative concepts of rationality which, it is suggested, could serve as this premiss (Hargreaves 
Heap, 1989).  In particular, following Max Weber, economists have distinguished between a range of 
rationalities including instrumental, value, substantive, procedural and expressive rationality.   
Lagueux(2010)  has convincingly shown that some of these are not alternative concepts, but the 
same concepts seen from different angles.   For example, substantive rationality describes decisions 
which do in fact promote the goals of the actor, while procedural rationality describes the process of 
arriving at those decisions.  It is difficult to see how a process of decision making which leads to 
substantively non-rational behaviour can be regarded as procedurally rational, and vice versa.  The 
opposite of (substantive) rationality is not some other kind of rationality but irrationality.   
A similar approach might be applied to value rationality.  It is held that it is instrumentally rational to 
behave in a way which promotes a particular goal, but the selection of the goal itself is an instance of 
value rationality: it is said to be more rational to select some goals than others, life over death, 
pleasure over pain, and so on.  However, this appears to rest on a confusion.  If goals are truly ends, 
then they are not selected by agents at all, but given to reason by the passions to which ͞reason is … 
slave͟ (Hume, 1888, p 415).  On the other hand, if they are selected by agents, then they are 
selected as a means – a means to an end lying beyond them, an end which is itself given to reason 
by the passions.  This is not to say that there are not higher and lower goals, only that it is 
inappropriate to deem them the spheres of different kinds of rationality, and, in particular, that it is 
͚ǀalue-ƌatioŶal͛ to adopt soŵe high-level goals aŶd ͚ǀalue-iƌƌatioŶal͛ to adopt otheƌs.   
A related argument may be made regarding the distinction between parametric and strategic 
rationality (Elster, 1984).  It is certainly the case that rational agents will act differently, depending 
on whether they expect other agents to respond (strategic behaviour) or not (parametric behaviour).  
But to regard this as exemplifying two different kinds of rationality seems unjustified.  Finally, the 
opposition between expressive and substantive rationality is vulnerable to the same criticism as that 
made of the instrumental-value polarity above.  If one chooses, for example, to give blood, in order 
to eǆpƌess ǁho oŶe is, theŶ ǁe ĐaŶ eƋuallǇ desĐƌiďe oŶe͛s ĐhoiĐe of ǁheƌe to liǀe, ǁhat oĐĐupatioŶ 
to follow, how much leisure to take, what form of transport to use, and indeed choices regarding 
eǀeƌǇ otheƌ aspeĐt of oŶe͛s life as iŶstaŶĐes of the saŵe kiŶd of ƌatioŶalitǇ.  The ďehaǀiouƌs aƌe oŶĐe 
again simply adopted as instruments or means to ends which are given to reason: they exemplify 
substantive rationality.   
A major consequence of the assumption of rationality is that the rational agent will optimise.  That 
is, that, given all the constraints he faces, he will do what is best suited to promoting his interest.  
This is rational because, given that it is possible for him to take this action, any alternative action 
would be suboptimal, and therefore irrational.  This simple point has been subjected to a firestorm 
of criticism, in particular from a tradition following writers such as Herbert Simon (1976), and 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and which has come to be known as behavioural economics.  In 
particular, it is said that agents may not optimise, because 
- they may lack the information to do so; 
- they may lack the computational power to do so, and because; 
- they may lack the motivation to do so, in that they may adopt unselfish goals.   
It is, however, completely mistaken to see these points as in any way a challenge to the neoclassical 
paradigm, rather than a refinement and development of neoclassical thinking.  It is entirely possible 
for neoclassical economists to adopt these points and correspondingly to develop the constraints 
the agent is working under, and the rational responses available.  The agent with limited information 
aŶd ĐoŵputatioŶal poǁeƌ, the ͚ďouŶdedlǇ ƌatioŶal͛ ageŶt, ǁill deǀelop stƌatageŵs foƌ ĐopiŶg 
including rules of thumb and social institutions which economise on information and computation.  
The criticism that agents may adopt unselfish goals is not to the point since it is not a requirement of 
neoclassical thought that the individual will only adopt the most narrowly selfish goals.  On the 
contrary, the agent may place whatever weight he feels like on the welfare of other individuals or 
society as a whole, or such ideals as literacy and charity.  The point is that, once adopted, they are 
arguments in his utility function, and are then treated as his interests.   The criticisms of the 
͚selfishŶess͛ of ŶeoĐlassiĐal ageŶts is laƌgelǇ as ŵisplaĐed as the siŵilaƌ ĐƌitiĐisŵ of the ͚selfishŶess͛ 
of genes in the evolutionary theory of Richard Dawkins (Dawkins, 1989, p. 267).   
The problem with the neoclassical notion of rationality lies elsewhere.  In particular, the neoclassical 
stance assumes that micro-level rationality, the rationality of individual agents, is translated by the 
market system into macro-level rationality, the desirability of the social consequences of the actions 
of rational individual agents.  This belief allows neoclassical economics to argue that laissez-faire 
works: rational individual behaviour underpins desirable social outcomes, so there is no need for 
society to intervene by means of its political organisations, its states.  There is an alternative view, 
articulated by such writers as Keynes and Marx, (Keynes, 1936, p. xxxii;  Marx, 1975, p 87) that social 
pathology emerges at the macro level, that individually rational behaviour may issue in collectively 
irrational consequences, if the incentive structure facing individuals is such as to guide them to 
undesirable outcomes.  It is interesting to see both standpoints articulated in a recent and well-
known article by Paul Krugman (2009) on the financial and economic crisis which emerged in the late 
2000s.  Alongside repeated statements that markets might not be perfect we see repeated 
ĐoŶdeŵŶatioŶ of the ŶotioŶ of ƌatioŶal ageŶts: ͞economists fell back in love with the old, idealized 
vision of an economy in which rational individuals interact in perfect markets, this time gussied up 
with faŶĐǇ eƋuatioŶs … They turned a blind eye to the limitations of human rationality that often 
lead to ďuďďles aŶd ďusts͟ ;p. MM36). 
KƌugŵaŶ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ appƌoaĐh thus ďiŶds togetheƌ tǁo distiŶĐt staŶĐes.  OŶe is to adopt the KeǇŶesiaŶ 
view that markets do not spontaneously generate optimal outcomes, the other is to adopt the 
neoclassical view that markets automatically transform individual rationality into collective 
rationality, and hence, that if there is collective irrationality it must be due to individual irrationality.  
For the latter argument, behavioural economics and behavioural finance come at a very helpful 
moment.  Similarly Akeƌlof aŶd “hilleƌ ;ϮϬϬϵͿ iŶ a ǁidelǇ Đeleďƌated ďook oŶ ͚aŶiŵal spiƌits͛ aƌgue 
that ͞staŶdaƌd ŵaĐƌoeĐoŶoŵists haǀe [foĐused] oŶ hoǁ the eĐoŶoŵǇ ǁould ďehaǀe if people had 
oŶlǇ eĐoŶoŵiĐ ŵotiǀes aŶd if theǇ ǁeƌe also fullǇ ƌatioŶal͟ ;p. 168). From this perspective what is 
wrong with modern macroeconomics is that it fails to appreciate the breadth of motivations that 
individuals might have, and the fact that they might not act rationally – both intuitions which 
neoclassical economics has little difficulty impounding.  From the contrasting perspective, with roots 
in the writings of Marx (1975, 1976) and Keynes (1936) amongst others, any such attempt to 
understand macroeconomic pathologies, such as unemployment and crises, by tweaking the 
rationality of the agent incorporated in the model, looks very much like trying to understand a traffic 
jam by looking under the bonnet of the individual vehicle (Hofstadter, 1985).    
This raises the issue of substrate neutrality (Dennett, 1995).  Traffic jams and unemployment, like 
DaƌǁiŶiaŶ eǀolutioŶ iŶ DeŶŶett͛s aĐĐouŶt, aƌe fouŶded iŶ suďstƌate-neutral processes.  A traffic jam 
is consistent with a range of different types of engine, from internal combustion engines to horse-
drawn wagons, and even pedestrian traffic.  Again, the same vehicles which are involved in a traffic 
jam in a busy town could be running smoothly on the motorway.  Equally, unemployment and 
economic crises are compatible with a range of individual behaviours including both standard 
neoclassical rationality and bounded rationality.  Equally, the same individuals in a different context 
could be participating in a well-functioning economy.  Within limits the same micro-foundations, 
including individual agent rationality, are consistent with multiple outcomes, and the same outcome 
is compatible with a range of substrate properties.  This is not to suggest that it is impossible for 
mechanical failure in an individual vehicle to cause a traffic jam, or for irrational behaviour to cause 
economic crises.  What is suggested rather is that it is an empirical issue: each instance of macro-
level suboptimality has to be investigated to see whether its roots lie in individual failure or in 
perverse consequences of the network of social relations within which each individual is embedded.  
The neoclassical reductionist assumption that the social world is a congeries, and that individual and 
social rationality are therefore directly linked, hobbles economic science, reducing it to apologetics.   
Daniel Dennett (1971) identifies ͞the assuŵptioŶ of ƌatioŶalitǇ͟ ǁith the iŶteŶtioŶal staŶĐe.  AŶ 
intentional system is one whose behaviour can be understood by ascribing to it beliefs and desires.  
The iŶteŶtioŶal staŶĐe pƌediĐts ďehaǀiouƌ ͞ďǇ asĐƌiďiŶg to the sǇsteŵ the possessioŶ of Đertain 
information and by supposing it to be directed by certain goals and then by working out the most 
ƌeasoŶaďle oƌ appƌopƌiate aĐtioŶ oŶ the ďasis of these asĐƌiptioŶs͟ ;p. 90).  Neoclassical economic 
ageŶts aƌe iŶteŶtioŶal sǇsteŵs iŶ DeŶŶett͛s seŶse.  Following Dilthey and Weber (Gerth and Wright 
Mills, 1948, p. 56), this is sometimes expressed in terms of Verstehen – the interpretation of human 
aĐtioŶ ďǇ ŵeaŶs of the oďseƌǀeƌ͛s huŵaŶ eŵpathǇ ǁith the aĐtoƌ.  This has been taken up 
particularly within the Austrian School.  For Hayek (1979), for example, in order to understand 
soĐietǇ ǁe ŵust staƌt ǁith ͞the ĐoŶĐepts aŶd ǀieǁs held ďǇ iŶdiǀiduals ǁhiĐh aƌe diƌeĐtlǇ kŶoǁŶ to 
us͟ aŶd pƌoĐeed fƌoŵ these eleŵeŶts ͞to ďuild up the ŵoƌe Đoŵpleǆ pheŶoŵeŶa͟ of soĐietǇ: ͞it is 
the attitudes of individuals which are the familiar elements and by the combination of which we try 
to ƌepƌoduĐe the Đoŵpleǆ pheŶoŵeŶa, the ƌesults of iŶdiǀidual aĐtioŶs, ǁhiĐh aƌe ŵuĐh less kŶoǁŶ͟ 
(p. 65).  It is this starting from the individual agent, with whose beliefs and motives we can 
empathise, which, for Hayek (op. cit.) , qualifies our method as methodologically individualist.   
This, however, is only the beginning.  We can understand the behaviour of agents because like us 
they are huŵaŶ, like us theǇ haǀe ďeliefs aŶd ŵotiǀes, like us theǇ aƌe iŶteŶtioŶal sǇsteŵs: ͞ǁe ĐaŶ 
recognize these elements of human relationships only because they are known to us from the 
ǁoƌkiŶgs of ouƌ oǁŶ ŵiŶds͟ ;HaǇek, ϭϵϳϵ, p. 59).  But the intentional stance can be applied to any 
system in which it makes sense to speak of information and goals.  An obvious non-human example 
is that of genes.  The selfish gene programme (Dennett, 1995; Dawkins, 1989) is an application of the 
intentional stance to DNA.  For HaǇek ;ϭϵϳϵͿ, the suďjeĐt ŵatteƌ of soĐial sĐieŶĐe is the ͞Ŷetǁoƌk of 
ƌelatioŶships͟ ǁithiŶ ǁhiĐh iŶdiǀiduals aƌe eŵďedded, ͞the soĐial stƌuĐtuƌe [ǁhiĐh] ĐaŶ ƌeŵaiŶ the 
saŵe although diffeƌeŶt iŶdiǀiduals suĐĐeed eaĐh otheƌ at paƌtiĐulaƌ poiŶts͟, ͞the ĐoŶstant 
stƌuĐtuƌal eleŵeŶt ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ ďe sepaƌated aŶd studied iŶ isolatioŶ͟ ;p. 59).  Again, for Hayek (1978), 
this social structure, this network of relations, like DNA, has been through an evolutionary process.  
It remains a challenge for social science to applǇ ͞the assuŵptioŶ of ƌatioŶalitǇ͟ aŶd the iŶteŶtioŶal 
stance, as exemplified in the selfish gene programme, to the evolution of institutions.  That is, to 
recognise that social forms survive and evolve, not in order to serve human purposes, but because 
they are good surviving, good at levering themselves into subsequent generations.  This raises the 
prospect of supra-individual social entities enjoying their own rationality, and coordinating social 
activity in their own interests, interests different from or even opposed to those of their human 
substrate.  States (Marx, 1975) and corporations (Marx, 1976) are immediate candidates for this kind 
of analysis.   
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